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TO SUE AND BE SUED:




Can American Indian nations sue and be sued in federal and state
courts? Specific issues are whether tribes have corporate capacity to
sue, whether a Native group has recognized status as a tribe, and
whether and to what extent tribes and their officers have governmental
immunity from suit. Tribal capacity to sue is now well established, and
federal law has well-defined procedures and rules for tribal recogni-
tion. But tribal sovereign immunity is actively disputed.
This Article reviews retained tribal sovereignty in general and
summarizes past contests over tribal capacity to sue and their resolu-
tion into today’s settled rule. Next is a concise statement of the law on
federal recognition of tribal entities. Most of the Article explains and
analyzes ongoing issues about tribal immunity from suit. Tribal im-
munity has been continuously recognized from the first reported deci-
sion, but tribes’ commercial activities, modern attacks on immunity
generally, and states-rights proclivities of some justices jeopardize its
existence. Much active litigation involves suits against tribal officers
and possible application of the Ex parte Young doctrine. For many rea-
sons, tribes are adopting carefully defined consents to suit, particularly
in relation to tribal casinos. This Article’s essential purpose is to give
tribes and their lawyers a full account of the law on tribal immunity
and current disputes about it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can American Indian nations sue and be sued in federal and state
courts?  The question is interwoven with tribes’ sovereign status,
which has been contested from earliest legal disputes. Subsidiary is-
sues are whether tribes have corporate capacity to sue, whether a Na-
tive group has recognized status as a tribe, and whether and to what
† Professor, University of Colorado Law School.  Thanks for comments and criti-
cisms at the Colorado Law Conference on Tribal Sovereign Immunity, September 12,
2014, and for the research assistance of M. Katie Petersen, Colorado Law, class of 2015;
Shalyn Kettering, Colorado Law, class of 2016; and Caitlin Doyle, Colorado Law, class
of 2018.
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extent tribes and their officers have governmental immunity from
suit.  Capacity to sue is now well established, and federal law has
well-defined procedures and rules for tribal recognition.1  But tribal
sovereign immunity is actively disputed.
This Article first reviews retained tribal sovereignty in general.
It then summarizes past contests over tribal capacity to sue and their
resolution into today’s settled rule.  Next is a concise statement of the
law on federal recognition of tribal entities.  Most of the Article ex-
plains and analyzes ongoing issues about tribal immunity from suit.
These are often defined by their frequent appearance in relation to
tribal casinos.
II. SOVEREIGNTY
What entities other than natural persons can sue and be sued in
Anglo-American courts?  Private organizations acquire capacity to sue
from positive law, most commonly by incorporation,2 and the limited
immunities available to private defendants must also be found in af-
firmative rules.3  But corporate capacity of sovereign entities is inher-
ent,4 and American law has treated sovereign immunity as received
law.5  For these reasons, tribes’ standing in federal and state courts
has often depended on their status as governments.6
British and American governments elected to respect Native sov-
ereignty by denominating their agreements with tribes as treaties.7
However, tribal sovereignty would not likely have survived Jackso-
nian politics absent the United State Supreme Court’s 1831-32 Chero-
1. See infra Sections III-IV.
2. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 23 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017).
3. Most important is the privilege against self incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend.
V.  Other immunities are statutory. See, e.g., 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife §§ 237-
39, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (inter-spousal immunity).
4. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850) (“As a
corporation or body politic,” the United States may bring lawsuits to enforce its contract
and property rights.”); Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 181 (1818)
(United States may sue for specific performance or damages); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405-09 (1792) (state may sue to vindicate its common law proprietary
rights); United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1216 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747)
(“The United States is a government, and, consequently a body politic and corporate,
capable of attaining the objects for which it was created, by the means which are neces-
sary for their attainment.”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81
VA. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (1995) (discussing states’ right to sue to vindicate common law
rights).
5. See infra Section V.A-B.
6. See infra passim.  In one instance, tribal sovereignty was invoked to deny a
legal claim. Inyo Cty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 708-12 (2003) (tribe
had no right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) because of its sovereign status;
rights under the statute are limited to private parties).
7. See NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§§ 1.02-.03 (2012); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, INDIAN TREATIES 2-9 (1994).
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kee decisions.8  The first of these, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,9
directly contested the issue.  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion of the
Court concluded:
Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in the sense in which
that term is used in the constitution? . . . So much of the argu-
ment as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees
as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing it-
self, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been com-
pletely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a
state from the settlement of our country. The numerous trea-
ties made with them by the United States recognize them as
a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and
war, of being responsible in their political character for any
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression commit-
ted on the citizens of the United States by any individual of
their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of
these treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize
the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by
those acts.10
The point was strongly restated in the Court’s opinion (for a six-
to-one majority) in Worcester v. Georgia:11 “The Indian nations had
always been considered as distinct, independent political communi-
ties, retaining their original natural rights . . . .”12
After the Cherokee decisions, tribal sovereignty was suppressed
by government policy for many years but revived in modern times.13
It is firmly entrenched for authority over tribal members, but the Su-
preme Court has severely restricted tribal authority over nonmem-
8. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Moral-
ity (1969), 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 503-08 (1969).
9. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  The Cherokees invoked the United States Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to sue Georgia by claiming to be a foreign state.  As the text
indicates, the Court held the tribe to be a state, but not a foreign state as the latter term
is used in Article III, Section 2, and dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).  Famously, the Court described Indian
tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
10. Marshall’s reference to “a majority of the judges” referred to himself, Justice
M’Lean who joined his opinion, and Justices Story and Thompson, whose opinion agreed
with the quoted language but dissented on the ultimate question of whether the Chero-
kee Nation was a foreign state as that term appears in Article III.  Justices Baldwin and
Johnson concurred in the judgment, agreeing with Marshall that the Cherokee Nation
was not a foreign state but disagreeing with his quoted language.  Justice Duval was
absent.  Thus, Marshall’s majority was a four-to-two vote for the quoted language in a
Court of seven.
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
13. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: SOCIETIES
IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
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bers.14  However, this limit has no bearing on the issues perused in
this Article.
III. CAPACITY TO SUE15
Since the founding, no reported federal decision has dismissed a
suit by an American Indian tribe for lack of capacity to sue.16  The
only reported dismissals were in courts of a single state, New York.17
However, the political posture adopted by influential persons and or-
ganizations in the late nineteenth century and the prestige of New
York decisions created doubt about the issue for many years.  The
New York opinions simply asserted lack of capacity, apparently equat-
ing tribes with private, unincorporated associations but without ana-
lyzing the question.18  The political forces, led by Harvard Law
Professor James Bradley Thayer, claimed that tribes and their mem-
bers had no legal rights, so their federal relationship must be ended.19
Lack of capacity to sue was a necessary part of the claim.  Two legal
theories were asserted.  One was that the Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia20 decision had been based on lack of capacity.21  The other was
that tribes were wards of the federal government who had no indepen-
14. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for Sover-
eignty: Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 641, 644 (2003); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist
Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 267, 267 (2001).
15. Capacity to sue is, unfortunately, often misunderstood.  Legal comments
sometimes confuse it with the outcome of a lawsuit decided on other grounds.  Notably,
the holding in Cherokee Nation that the Cherokees were not a foreign state has been
called lack of capacity. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919); infra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text (government lawyers argued that interpretation of
the case but were rebuffed by a unanimous Court).  Another point of confusion is with
racist laws that disadvantaged Indians in nineteenth-century state courts. See, e.g.,
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).  These were wrong on the merits, not for lack of
capacity to sue.  Still another confusion is with laws that define federal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb. 1879) (No.
14, 891) (rejecting such a claim).
16. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867) (three tribal chiefs suc-
cessfully sued in a representative capacity, but no one raised a question about capacity).
The issue of capacity to sue was first presented to the Supreme Court in Lane v. Pueblo
of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
17. Lack of capacity appeared as dictum in Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige Ch. 607
(N.Y. Ch. 1845).  It became a holding in Montauk Tribe of Indians v. Long Island R.R.,
51 N.Y.S. 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898); Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 62 N.E. 1098
(N.Y. 1901), cert. dismissed, 189 U.S. 306 (1903); and Johnson v. Long Island R.R., 56
N.E. 992, 993 (N.Y. 1900).  In Johnson, the court held that tribal rights cannot be en-
forced in a representative action, either.
18. See Johnson, 56 N.E. at 993.
19. See Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People Without Law, 5 INDIGENOUS
L.J. 83, 95-101 (2006).
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
21. See Collins & Miller, supra note 19, at 97.
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dent juristic capacity, so the United States could sue to vindicate tri-
bal rights, but tribes could not do so on their own.22  Both claims were
part of noisy and determined political support for forced assimilation
of Indian people, which dominated federal policy from the 1850s until
the late 1920s.23
The political clamor and the New York decisions led to hornbook
statements that tribes lacked capacity to sue.24  And a United States
Court of Claims judge agreed in a complex ruling about service of pro-
cess.25  However, the theory was trounced when a tribe sued the Sec-
retary of the Interior to protect its land, and government lawyers
(representing tribes’ purported trustee) moved to dismiss for lack of
capacity.26  A unanimous Supreme Court categorically rejected the
claim:
The case of [Cherokee Nation], on which the [federal] de-
fendants place some reliance, is not in point. The question
there was not whether the Cherokee tribe had the requisite
capacity to sue in a court of general jurisdiction, but whether
it was a “foreign state” in the sense of the judiciary article of
the Constitution and therefore entitled to maintain an origi-
nal suit in this court against the State of Georgia. The court
held that the tribe, although uniformly treated as a distinct
political society capable of engaging in treaty stipulations,
was not a “foreign state” in the sense intended, and so could
not maintain such a suit.
The defendants assert with much earnestness that the
Indians of this pueblo are wards of the United States—recog-
nized as such by the legislative and executive departments
and that in consequence the disposal of their lands is not
within their own control, but subject to such regulations as
Congress may prescribe for their benefit and protection. As-
suming, without so deciding, that this is all true, we think it
has no real bearing on the point we are considering. Certainly
it would not justify the defendants in treating the lands of
these Indians—to which, according to the bill, they have a
complete and perfect title—as public lands of the United
States and disposing of the same under the public land laws.
22. See id. at 99.
23. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 1.04.
24. 22 WILLIAM MACK & HOWARD PERVEAR NASH, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCE-
DURE 120-21 (1906); 31 WILLIAM MACK & WILLIAM BENJAMIN HALE, CORPUS JURIS 488-
89 (1923) (repeating verbatim 22 MACK & NASH, supra).  The only case citations were to
the New York decisions.
25. Jaeger v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 278, 282-88 (1892).  The tribe was not a
party to the case, so its capacity to sue was not directly at issue. Collins & Miller, supra
note 19, at 104-08.
26. Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
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That would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act
of confiscation. Besides, the Indians are not here seeking to
establish any power or capacity in themselves to dispose of
the lands, but only to prevent a threatened disposal by ad-
ministrative officers in disregard of their full ownership. Of
their capacity to maintain such a suit we entertain no doubt.
The existing wardship is not an obstacle, as is shown by re-
peated decisions of this court, of which Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553, is an illustration.27
Despite that holding, there was continuing doubt about the issue
within the legal profession.  The compilers of the original (1941) edi-
tion of Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law stated that the
issue was uncertain.28  However, legal events after that date either
assumed or sustained tribal capacity.  In 1946, Congress gave tribes
the same general right to sue the United States for damages as other
claimants.29  In 1966 Congress provided original jurisdiction in fed-
eral district courts of federal question claims brought by recognized
Indian tribes regardless of the amount in controversy.30  As there has
never been any question about the power of Congress to authorize
tribes to sue, this removed any remaining doubt in federal courts, and
the New York courts had reformed.31  Two years later, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the argument that individual Indian benefi-
ciaries could not sue to protect property held in trust for them by the
United States.32
In sum, Congress has consistently upheld tribal capacity to sue,
and the Supreme Court has never accepted the claim that tribes or
Indians lack capacity.  When the issue has been presented to it, the
Court has firmly rejected the claim.  No state denies tribal capacity,
and none save New York has ever done so.
27. Lane, 249 U.S. at 112-14.  For later proceedings in this complex matter, see
Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315 (1927).
28. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 277-79, 283-85 (1941).
29. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1049, 1055 (codified as amended
and re-enacted at 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012)).  Lack of federal consent to treaty claims had
hampered tribes and contributed to the capacity confusion. See Collins & Miller, supra
note 19, at 102, 112-15.
30. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (2012)).  In 1980, the general federal question statute was amended to remove
the jurisdictional amount for all plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (text and
annotations).
31. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Burr, 522 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (hold-
ing that federal and state statutes authorized all tribes to sue in New York courts. The
state’s highest court has not reviewed the issue, but the former New York rule seems
clearly gone).
32. Poafpybitty v. Skelley Oil, 390 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1968).  The decision had many
precursors that should have settled the issue long before. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665 (1912); Tiger v. W. Inv., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); Ray A. Brown, The Indian Problem
and the Law 39 YALE L.J. 307, 314-15 (1930).
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IV. FEDERAL RECOGNITION
Federal recognition as an Indian tribe is necessary for tribes to
have rights of self-government protected by federal law and for other
distinctive legal rights, notably those that derive from federal trust
status of tribal land.33  Pertinent to issues addressed in this Article,
only federally recognized tribes have capacity to sue based on 28
U.S.C. § 1362 and sovereign immunity to suit in external courts.34
Following American independence, tribal recognition by the U.S.
government was by treaty, an exercise of the Treaty Power.35  The
dominant federal purpose for most treaties was to obtain cessions of
tribal land by peaceful means, so the government readily accepted the
tribes’ corporate capacity to convey.36  Federal negotiators identified
tribal parties with whom to treat.  At times this involved consolidating
several Native bands that had been independent.37  At other times tri-
bal factions were chosen to manipulate the process.38  After tribes
ceased to be a security threat to the new nation, treaties were often
coerced.39  Unfairness resulted, but it is now in the distant past.40
After treaty making ended, federal power derived from the Indian
Commerce Clause, and it continues today.41  Legal status of tribes
thus depends on federal statutes and treaties and on their application
by administrators and courts.42  Former federal policies sought to ter-
minate tribes’ federal status, but termination policies have been repu-
33. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at
§ 3.02[3].  Of course, tribes have their own view of the issue, and some tribes were recog-
nized by Eastern state governments. See Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Ori-
gins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17 (1979).
34. On the statute, see supra note 30 and accompanying text. On immunity, see
infra Section V.
35. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, § 3.02.
36. See id. § 1.03[1]; PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 103-04.
37. See PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 210-13.
38. Most notorious was President Jackson’s selection of treaty parties for Cherokee
removal. See Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 49, 72-73 (2010).
39. See PRUCHA, supra note 7, at 129; JAY KINNEY, A CONTINENT LOST—A CIVILIZA-
TION WON 37-45, 93-94 (1937).
40. Federal policy addressed many treaty-based grievances by payments in so-
called claims cases, most of them pursuant to the Indian Claims Commission Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified at various §§ of 25 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.).  For the most part, payments were woefully inadequate. See Richard B. Collins,
Never Construed to Their Prejudice, 84 COLO. L. REV. 1, 23-41 (2013).
41. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 3.02[4].  Some academics disagree. See, e.g.,
Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015) (fed-
eral authority should be based on general constitutional structure rather than the Com-
merce Clause); NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.01[4].
42. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at
§ 3.02[1]-[6].
398 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
diated and some terminated tribes restored to federal status.43  In
1978, the Bureau of Indian Affairs established an elaborate procedure
for recognition of tribes that has formalized the process.44
V. FEDERAL AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS
BACKGROUND
Tribal sovereign immunity derives from general American immu-
nity doctrine, particularly that of the federal government.  Therefore,
a grounding in general law is important to a full understanding of
tribes’ connection to the doctrine.
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AT THE FOUNDING
Soon after independence, the doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit was subject to significant differences of opinion and concep-
tion.  The view that immunity was received doctrine was expressed in
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 81:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent.  This is the
general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now en-
joyed by the government of every State in the Union.45
The issue was less settled than Hamilton claimed.  Most states had
not yet addressed the issue internally, and of course his essay pre-
ceded ratification of the federal Constitution.46  However, in the de-
cades after ratification of the Constitution, federal courts and those of
every state accepted sovereign immunity as domestic law.47  Theories
43. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.06.
44. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2014); NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 3.02[7].  For
discussion of issues about definition and application of the regulation, see Gerald Carr,
Origins and Development of the Mandatory Criteria Within the Federal Acknowledge-
ment Process, 14 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1 (2013); Roberto Iraola, The Administrative
Tribal Recognition Process and the Courts, 38 AKRON L. REV. 867 (2005).  The Interior
Department recently completed a thorough revision of the rules. See BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/ORM/83revise/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2018.)
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion
in the 1790s, 1993 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 73; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-99 (1983).
During the Confederation period, only one reported case ruled on immunity, Nathan v.
Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. C. 1781).  The court sustained Virginia’s immunity to
suit in a Pennsylvania court. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 13 (1972).
47. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857); THOMSON/WEST CIVIL
ACTIONS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENTS § 1.6 (2d ed. 1992–2002); Edwin M. Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1924).
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varied, and debates about English precedents on immunity raged.48
One factor was concern over how money judgments against an un-con-
senting administration would be enforced.49
From the outset, another form of contest about immunity arose
when litigants sued government officers rather than governments by
name. Established peremptory writs and equitable remedies contin-
ued to be recognized.50  American lawyers take for granted that Wil-
liam Marbury could seek mandamus for his commission save for his
mistaken choice of forum.51  However, all American jurisdictions held
that suing an officer for damages based on actions arising within the
officer’s duties were barred by immunity.52
B. STATE IMMUNITY IN FEDERAL COURTS: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
Constitutional ratification began a history of legal contests (and
academic obsession) over state immunity from federal authority,
which continues.  At ratification conventions, anti-Federalists claimed
that the proposed Constitution would allow money judgments against
states in the new federal courts.53  Madison, Marshall, and other Fed-
eralists argued that state immunity would bar them.54  The anti-Fed-
eralist claim raised enough concerns that several conventions sought
amendments to forbid such suits.55  But these pleas were not enough
for a proposal to emerge in Madison’s draft of the Bill of Rights or in
any amendments Congress made to it.56
States’ Revolutionary War debts spurred creditors’ lawyers to ex-
plore every avenue for collection.57  In state courts, their claims con-
48. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2-19 (1963).
49. Hamilton mentioned the point in Federalist No. 81. See also Louisiana v.
Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883); JACOBS, supra note 46, at 56-57, 72.
50. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (2012) (authorizing writs)); Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as
the First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 501-12
(2004).
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-73 (1803) (discussing proper
applications of the writ of mandamus).
52. See Jaffe, supra note 48, at 11-17.
53. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 27-40.
54. See id. at 34; see also 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533,
556 (2d ed. 1836). But see JACOBS, supra note 46, at 11-14 (Madison letter to Washing-
ton on the need for national judicial power).
55. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 27-40.
56. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451-53 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
57. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 8.  Federal war debts were affirmed by Section VI
ch. 1 of the Constitution.  But debate about state debts raged during ratification. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
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fronted sovereign immunity, relegating the action to legislatures.58
External plaintiffs were more likely concerned about local hostility
and tempted by the new diversity jurisdiction of federal courts.59  In
1790 the intergovernmental avenue generated suits that started a
complex series of events.  Alexander Chisholm filed a diversity action
against Georgia in the Circuit Court for the District of Georgia seek-
ing judgment on a 1777 debt for war supplies bought by the state.60
The state pleaded sovereign immunity.  The court, anchored by Su-
preme Court Justice James Iredell, dismissed, and Supreme Court re-
view was not sought.61  Another 1790 suit was a diversity action
against Maryland filed as an original case in the Supreme Court.62
Dutch financiers sought repayment of their 1782 loan to the state.63
However, Maryland did not assert sovereign immunity and settled the
case.64
Rather than appeal the dismissal, Chisholm, represented by At-
torney General Edmund Randolph, filed an original action in the Su-
preme Court.65  Based on its sovereignty defense in the circuit court,
Georgia refused to appear or plead.66  On motion of Chisholm’s coun-
sel, the Court rejected Georgia’s defense and ordered the state to ap-
pear.67  Four of five justices voted to allow the action, and their
seriatim opinions articulated a strong case, albeit with variations in
reasoning.68  Stronger yet was the political outcry against the deci-
sion, manifested by adoption of the Eleventh Amendment to overrule
it.69  Upon its ratification in 1798, all pending actions based on
58. See Daniel C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the
United States: 1790-1955, 1966 ILL. L.F. 795, 801-03 (1966) (reviewing early state im-
munity decisions).
59. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
60. JACOBS, supra note 46, at 47 (describing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793)). Chisholm was the executor.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 43-44 (describing Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401
(1791)).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 44.
65. See id. at 47-48.
66. See id. at 48.
67. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419.
68. See id.; JACOBS, supra note 46, at 50-55; JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 13-16 (1987);
Gibbons, supra note 46, at 1923-26.  Justice Iredell, who had sustained immunity in the
circuit court, was the lone dissenter.
69. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 64-68; ORTH, supra note 68, at 20-21; Gibbons,
supra note 46, at 1926-34.  Jacobs makes the intriguing argument that Hamilton’s 1790
success in persuading Congress to assume most of the states’ war debts much reduced
importance of the amendment and aided its passage by easing opposition of strong na-
tionalists. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 69-72.
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Chisholm v. Georgia,70 were dismissed.71  But the Amendment’s nar-
row wording—forbidding only diversity cases against a state72—
fueled legal maneuvers and arguments that continue today.
C. STATE IMMUNITY IN FEDERAL COURTS SINCE 1798
The Marshall Court reviewed four claims of state immunity based
on the Eleventh Amendment.  Only one involved a state by name as
litigant; the Court correctly held that the Eleventh Amendment was
not intended to affect federal appellate jurisdiction.73
The other three decisions involved suits against state officers
rather than states by name.  Most Eleventh Amendment decisions
since ratification have revolved around the question whether and
when the Amendment is avoided by suing an officer.  The progression
started innocently enough in a case in which the Court rejected the
defense because no state property was at issue.74  The next case arose
from state seizure at gunpoint of money from the Ohio branch of the
Bank of the United States in 1819.75  In anticipation of the attack, the
Bank had obtained a federal court injunction against the state officers
authorized to do it.76  The seizure violated the injunction and gener-
ated court orders to return what was taken, which the Supreme Court
affirmed.  Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment claim was rejected by
reading its terms literally to apply only when the State by name is a
party.77  But the decision accorded with later rulings allowing pro-
spective relief in suits against officials.78
The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo,79 the fourth Marshall Court
decision, was the only one to enforce the Amendment.80  It arose from
a complex series of events that the Court’s majority interpreted as a
70. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
71. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381-82 (1798).  Congress’s
referral of the Eleventh Amendment did not need the President’s signature; based on
the amendment’s wording, all pending suits dismissed except one in which a plaintiff
was a foreign state, and thus not within the amendment’s specific terms.  For details on
other contemporary suits against states, see JACOBS, supra note 46, at 57-64 (discussing
an example).
72. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
73. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393-94 (1821).
74. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139-40 (1809).  For details, see
JACOBS, supra note 46, at 77-81; ORTH, supra note 68, at 35-36.
75. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
76. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 840.
77. Id. at 857-58.
78. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
79. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
80. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
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diversity claim against the Governor of Georgia to contest ownership
of slaves illegally imported into the state.81  The Court concluded that
the State had lawful ownership.  Thus, though nominally a case
against the Governor, the State was the real party in interest.82  That
brought the case indirectly within the Eleventh Amendment’s terms.
The Taney Court made no change in federal law on state immu-
nity.  The Panic of 1837 caused state defaults that induced creditors to
look for federal remedies, but nothing came of their efforts.83  How-
ever, major changes emerged from the Civil War’s aftermath.  Confed-
erate states’ war debts were voided by the Fourteenth Amendment,
but sizeable debts were incurred before and after the war.84  The
states were impoverished and defaulted, often deliberately.85  Of
course creditors sought remedies.  Encountering immunity or antici-
pating hostility in state courts, they turned to federal forums.
Resulting cases brought the Eleventh Amendment into direct con-
flict with the Contracts Clause86 for the first time since Chisholm v.
Georgia87-era suits.  The main device to try to avoid Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity was again to sue an officer instead of a state by name,
relying on the Amendment’s explicit terms.88  In cases that reached
the Court during the 1870s, Contracts Clause supremacy coupled with
formal rejection of immunity prevailed.89  But in 1883 the Court
flipped and began to sustain immunity when it determined that a
state was the real party in interest.90  Although not all cases are con-
sistent, state immunity to damages in suits against officers acting
within their authority became, and remains, the governing rule.91
Another attempt to avoid the Amendment relied on its explicit
terms forbidding only diversity cases.92  Bernard Hans, a Louisiana
81. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 121-22.
82. Id. at 122-24.
83. See ORTH, supra note 68, at 41-46.
84. See id. at 53, 58-59; Gibbons, supra note 46, at 1976-77; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 4.
85. Gibbons, supra note 46, at 1976-77.
86. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Law . . . impairing
the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
87. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
88. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 107.
89. See ORTH, supra note 68, at 58-65.  During this period, the Court also strictly
enforced the Contracts Clause to overturn Southern state laws granting relief from pri-
vate debts. See James W. Ely Jr, The Contract Clause During the Civil War and Recon-
struction, 41 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257 (2016).
90. See ORTH, supra note 68, at 66-71; see also Gibbons, supra note 46, at 1978-98
(extensive argument that the Court’s switch was caused by the political changes that
ended Reconstruction).
91. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.11(c) (8th
ed. 2010).
92. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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citizen, sued his State for defaulting on its bonds, alleged to violate
the Contracts Clause, and thus to be under federal question jurisdic-
tion.93  The case was not within the Eleventh Amendment’s terms, but
the Court rejected his claim in an opinion that rewrote state sovereign
immunity.  It decided that the Eleventh Amendment merely restored
immunity implicit in the original constitutional structure, so that im-
munity bars all unconsented suits against states by name save cases
when the plaintiff is the United States or a sister state.94  The Court
in the same year went the other direction on immunity of cities, coun-
ties, and other local governments.95  They were denied any immunity
defense on grounds hard to reconcile with the rule for states.96  How-
ever, both rules continue in force today.97  Another consequence of the
Hans v. Louisiana98 revision was to allow federal jurisdiction when a
state consents, also contrary to the Eleventh Amendment’s wording.99
The next phase in the state immunity wars arose from decisions
in the 1890s in which suits sought to enjoin state officers from taking
actions alleged to be unconstitutional but did not seek money judg-
ments that would run against the state.100  One context was railroad
rate disputes; railroads or their investors sued state rate makers to
enjoin rate schemes alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.101
Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment pleas were rejected by distinguish-
ing between a state’s interest “in a governmental sense” from its pecu-
niary or property interest; immunity forbade only the latter.102  These
cases culminated in Ex parte Young,103 the famous 1908 decision that
has denominated the doctrine since its publication.104  This matched
intergovernmental cases to the rule for internal immunity within the
federal system: to recover damages or other retroactive relief, there
93. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
94. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-21.  The Court later held that foreign nations’ suits
against states are barred. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
95. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
96. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). See ORTH, supra note 68, at 119-20 (using the
phrase “bizarre results”).  As a consequence, courts must differentiate between suits
against local governments and suits against arms of a state government. See, e.g., Pen-
nhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).  Other decisions added a
third category, state instrumentalities, that are sufficiently distinct from the state to
lack immunity. E.g., United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,
804 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2015).
97. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 91, § 2.11(c)-(e).
98. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
99. Hans, 134 U.S. at 17-18.
100. See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 131-38.
101. See id. at 132-35.
102. Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390 (1894). See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (modern application of the distinction).
103. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
104. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See JACOBS, supra note 46, at 138-49;
ORTH, supra note 68, at 128-35.
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must be legislative consent.105  But a litigant can seek equitable relief
against future violations of law by suing an officer based on official
actions.106
The companion rules of Hans and Young governed state immunity
in federal court until a new question arose in 1964.  Prior Supreme
Court decisions had not involved a federal statute intended to override
state immunity.  In that year, the Court held that the Federal Em-
ployers’ Liability Act107 (“FELA”) intended to allow damages suits
against a state government that operated a common carrier, and that
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to authorize
damages actions against states.108  Twelve years later, the Court
reached a like decision for damages claims arising under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,109 based on Congress’s power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment.110  Later decisions overruled the FELA case and
established the current rule that Congress can override state immu-
nity to claims for damages or other retroactive relief only when it
properly invokes its powers to enforce one of the Civil War amend-
ments.111  Other modern decisions held that Indian tribes’ suits for
retroactive relief against a state are barred by the immunity rule of
Hans.112
D. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSENTS AND REFORMS
The alternative to suits looking for judicially-crafted ways to
avoid immunity is to seek legislative consent and to sue pursuant to a
consent statute.  In early years, claimants sought special bills in Con-
gress or state legislatures.113  Tiring of special bills, Congress created
the Court of Claims in 1855 and gave it power to enter judgments
against the Government in 1863.114  However, jurisdiction was lim-
ited to claims based on contract, statute, or regulation.115  Claims
105. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 424 (1976).
106. Testan, 424 U.S. at 424.  For cases arising under the Administrative Procedure
Act, an action for prospective relief can be filed against the United States by name.
Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
107. 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
108. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
109. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
110. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
111. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527. U.S. 666,
680 (1999). See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-80 (2000).
112. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
113. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625,
643-47 (1985).
114. See id. at 652, 656-68.
115. See id. at 663.
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based on treaties were expressly excepted, and those based on tort
were excepted by omission.116
Sovereign immunity to tort liability has long been the most ac-
tively contested field.  Anti-immunity reformers stress that those who
enter business deals with government entities have advance notice of
limits on their remedies and can plan accordingly, but tort victims
have no like opportunity, so that immunity is particularly unfair to
them.117  The randomness of torts has an opposing effect on legisla-
tors contemplating immunity waivers: effects of waivers are harder to
anticipate and plan for and risk larger money judgments.  Thus, Con-
gress had fully waived immunity to suit based on contracts and stat-
utes by 1863 but did not enact a general tort waiver until 1946.118
State legislatures lagged even more until spurred by a wave of state
court invalidations of tort immunity that Florida began in 1957.119
VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF INDIAN NATIONS
A. TRIBAL IMMUNITY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
1. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Recognized by Federal Courts in Pari
Materia with Federal and State Immunity120
Indian tribes were brought under the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity as soon as the issue reached federal courts.  Tribes were seldom
sued until modern times, but in the few instances in which they were,
courts consistently held that governmental immunity protected them
116. See Collins & Miller, supra note 19, at 102.  Federal sovereign immunity has
long been a huge barrier to redress of Indian claims for mishandling tribal property.  No
federal statute consents to claims for breach of federal trust control of Indian land.  The
omission continues to be an injustice to Native people. See Collins, supra note 40, at 32-
44.
117. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort—A Pro-
posed Reform, 11 VA. L. REG. 330, 332 (1925) (“The doctrine of State immunity in tort
survives by virtue of its antiquity alone.  It rests upon a historical error; and it is
neither sound, just nor responsive to the demands of modern social engineering.”).
118. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92 § 9, 12 Stat. 765 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)), with Act of June 25, 1946, ch. 646, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012)).
119. See Note, The Role of The Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964
DUKE L.J. 888 (1964); Kramer, supra note 58, at 801-26 (state tort immunity to 1955).
120. This part of the Article benefited from William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident:
The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587 (2013); Katherine Florey,
Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and Policy in the
Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765 (2008);
Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137 (2004);
Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661 (2002).
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from unconsented lawsuits.  The courts from an early date also opined
that immunity can be overridden by federal statute.121
Parks v. Ross122 was the first reported decision.  Parks sued John
Ross, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, for debts allegedly in-
curred for services during Cherokee removal in the late 1830s, the
event commonly called the Trail of Tears.123  The Court affirmed the
circuit court’s directed verdict against him. Ross had acted as an of-
ficer of the Cherokee Nation, which precluded personal liability
against him, a standard immunity rule.124  The opinion invoked lan-
guage traditionally used to describe state sovereign immunity, and it
paralleled principles in the 1789 Judiciary Act,125 which prohibited
federal court jurisdiction over foreign diplomats even though jurisdic-
tion seemingly exists under Article III.126
Chadick v. Duncan127 in 1894 was the first recorded instance of a
direct decision on tribal immunity, although argument in the case re-
ferred to three earlier, unrecorded rulings dismissing suits against a
tribe based on immunity from suit.128  Chadick alleged that the Cher-
okee Nation breached its contract with him to sell its bonds.  He
sought an injunction to compel the Cherokee Nation, its principal
chief and treasurer, and its delegates in Washington, D.C., to deliver
the bonds to him.129  The federal court dismissed based on tribal im-
munity.130  The court relied on state and foreign sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, which had developed substantially in the years after
Parks.  The cited cases held that sovereign immunity applied to claims
for injunctive relief as well as those seeking damages.  The court con-
cluded that tribes “are not amenable to suit anywhere at the instance
of any private individual.”131  The court cited and relied on the Su-
121. See, e.g., Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1895).
122. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1851).
123. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 373-74 (1851). For the classic story, see
ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES
(1973).
124. Parks, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 374.
125. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
126. Parks, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 374. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1568, 1590 (2002).
127. No. 15,317 (D.C. Mar. 3, 1894).
128. Chadick v. Duncan, No. 15,317 (D.C. Mar. 3, 1894) (available at National
Archives & Records Administration Record Group No. 376, Case File No. 314).  The D.C.
Supreme Court’s decision is not printed in the law reports but is recorded as cited in the
National Archives.  The reference to earlier, unreported rulings in the argument is in
the slip opinion at pages 70-71.  References to this case depend on Wood, supra note
120.
129. Chadick, slip op. at 73-74.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 78.
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preme Court’s contemporaneous immunity cases regarding actions
against states and their officials arising out of bond defaults.132
The first reported decision in a suit against a tribe by name was
decided in 1895.133  George Thebo sued the Choctaw Nation and its
principal chief and treasurer to recover attorney’s fees allegedly owed
him.134  The court upheld dismissal of the claim, citing the Supreme
Court’s decision in Beers v. Arkansas135 for the “well-established”
principle that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.136  The
Thebo137 court also relied on a public policy reason for the doctrine:
protecting the government’s fisc.  For these reasons Congress had
“sparingly exercised” its power to authorize suits against tribes, re-
flecting “the settled policy of the United States not to authorize . . .
suits [against tribes] except in a few cases.”138  Moreover, the “settled
policy” of tribal immunity extended not just to suits on contracts but
as well to “other causes of action.”139  Because Congress had not au-
thorized suits against the Choctaw Nation or its officials in the legisla-
tion establishing the U.S. court in Indian Territory or otherwise, the
Choctaws’ immunity barred Thebo’s lawsuit.140
In Adams v. Murphy,141 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the Creek Nation and its principal chief were exempt
from suit on a contract.142  The court explained that tribal immunity,
like state immunity, barred both actions for damages and actions
seeking prospective relief.143  The court cited its earlier decision in
Thebo, noting that this rule “has been the settled doctrine of the gov-
ernment from the beginning.”144  As in Thebo, the court relied on the
policy of protecting the tribal treasury, arguing that without immu-
132. Id. at 90-91 (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)).  Chadick appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  A few days later, a bill to
abrogate the Cherokees’ immunity was introduced in the House of Representatives. 26
CONG. REC. 2662 (1894).  It did not become law, however, and Chadick’s appeal was
dismissed for failure to print the transcript of record. See Chadick, No. 15,317.  But the
case garnered media attention: the Washington Post wrote about it at least four times.
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1894, at 4; WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1894, at 7; WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1894, at 3; WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1894, at 2. See also CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1894, at 1.
133. See Thebo, 66 F. 372.
134. See id.
135. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857).
136. Thebo, 66 F. at 375.
137. 66 F. 342 (8th Cir. 1895).
138. Thebo, 66 F. at 375-76.
139. Id. at 376.
140. Id. at 373.
141. 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
142. Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
143. Adams, 165 F. at 310-11 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 502, 504).
144. Id. at 308-09.
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nity, the tribes would be “overwhelmed” by litigation, with “disastrous
consequences.”145
In 1908 Congress showed its recognition of tribal immunity by ex-
pressly authorizing specific suits against six Indian tribes.146  Section
twenty-six of that act allowed Clarence Turner to sue the Creek Na-
tion for damages resulting from an 1890 incident in which a group of
Creek citizens destroyed his fence.  However, the Court of Claims held
against Turner, and the Supreme Court affirmed.147  The Court recog-
nized that the statute had overridden the tribe’s immunity but af-
firmed for lack of a cause of action.  It noted that under general law,
like “other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek Nation
was free from liability for injuries to persons or property due to mob
violence or failure to keep the peace.”148  Although the 1908 legisla-
tion overrode immunity, it did not create any right for him to recover
damages for mob violence since “no such liability existed by the gen-
eral law.”149  Turner thus failed to allege a cause of action.
In United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,150 the Supreme
Court first squarely relied on tribal immunity as a rule of decision.
The Court stated, “These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization,” citing the Eighth Circuit decisions in
145. Id.
146. Appropriations Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 2 (Menominee), § 5 (Choctaw),
§ 16 (Choctaw & Chickasaw), § 26 (Creek), § 27 (Mississippi Choctaw), 35 Stat. 444
(1908).  For a partially successful claim under § 5, see Heirs of Garland v. Choctaw Na-
tion, 272 U.S. 728 (1927).  For a failed claim based on § 2, see Green v. Menominee
Tribe, 233 U.S. 558 (1914).  This statute is notable because of its authorization of the
Turner case infra note 147.  It was not unique; consents appeared regularly in Indian
appropriation acts. See, e.g., Appropriations Act of May 25, 1918, ch. 86, § 18 (Choctaw),
40 Stat. 561, 583; Appropriations Act of June 20, 1906, ch. 3449, 34 Stat. 325, 344 (Qua-
paw enrollment), 345 (Choctaw), 365-66 (Osage). For a successful claim based on the
1918 statute, see McMurray v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 62 Ct. Cl. 458 (1926), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 524 (1927).
147. Turner v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 125 (1916), aff’d, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). See
also Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756-58 (1998) (sustaining tribal im-
munity from suit but in dictum declared a policy screed against the doctrine).  Included
was the assertion that its own prior decisions had mistakenly opined that tribal immu-
nity originated in Turner. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756.  That was true, but not for the reason
the Court stated.  As the Kiowa Court noted, the Turner Court assumed without discus-
sion that tribes had immunity. Id. at 757.  However, immunity was not at issue because
Congress had overridden it by statute.  Based on the consistent and uncontradicted de-
cisions of federal courts and actions of Congress, tribal immunity was a settled rule by
the time of Turner, so it was natural for the Court to assume it.  However, the basis for
holding against Turner, that he had no cause of action, depended on the governmental
character of the Creeks.  To that extent, the Turner Court expressly recognized tribal
sovereignty. Kiowa is further discussed infra notes 162, 187, 200-201 and accompany-
ing text.
148. Turner, 248 U.S. at 357-58.
149. Id. at 357.
150. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
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Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe and Adams v. Murphy,151 as well as Turner v.
United States.152  The Court did not discuss the immunity issue, but
the reason for that is apparent from the argument for the respondent,
which did not contest tribal immunity (as noted, all the precedent sup-
ported immunity) but argued that “Congress has consented to an af-
firmative judgment against the Tribes,” and that the immunity
defense had been waived by failure to assert it in a former action that
had gone to judgment without assertion of the defense.153
Whether tribal immunity could be waived in that manner was a
novel issue in the case; it had not been determined in any reported
decision.  The Court held that the prior judgment was
void in so far as it undertakes to fix a credit against the In-
dian Nations . . . . The Congress has made provision for cross-
suits against the Indian Nations by defendants.  This provi-
sion, however, is applicable only to “any United States court
in the Indian Territory.” Against this conclusion respondents
urge that as the right to file the claim against the debtor [in
Missouri] was transitory, the right to set up the cross-claim
properly followed the main proceeding.  The desirability for
complete settlement of all issues between parties must, we
think, yield to the principle of immunity.154
In other words, the Court held tribal immunity to be jurisdictional, as
is the immunity of the United States and the states.155
The review above covers all known decisions on tribal immunity
prior to World War II, and as noted, it was sustained in all of them.  It
may be useful to pause briefly to consider the theoretical basis for the
immunity rule.  As described above, immunity of the federal govern-
ment was treated as received law, essentially as an inherent aspect of
sovereign status and separation of powers.156  Tribal immunity de-
pended on federal recognition of retained tribal sovereignty, which
arose from the treaties between tribes and the United States.157  Like
other attributes of tribal sovereignty, immunity is subject to alteration
by Congress.158  Given this history, tribal immunity can be said to be
grounded in federal treaty and statutory law or in federal common
law.  The choice matters only insofar as it affects the Supreme Court’s
151. See supra notes 133, 141.
152. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
153. 248 U.S. 354 (1919). See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 508-09.
154. Id. at 512-13.
155. See Sarah L. Brinton, Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 237 (2014).
156. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 7, 10-11 and accompanying text.
158. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 5.02, 5.04 (reciting Court’s rule of plenary
federal power and academic claims that the power ought to be limited).
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self-defined freedom to overturn immunity without action by
Congress.159
2. Tribal Immunity in the Modern Era
In modern times, tribes have undertaken all manner of activities
that have provoked lawsuits against them, which have proliferated.
Since 1977, the Court has upheld immunity seven times.160  However,
the doctrine of governmental immunity has been under continuing at-
tack in legal discourse,161 and tribal immunity has received its share
of criticism.162
All the immunity decisions related in the prior section arose from
activities of the Cherokee and Choctaw, two of the five powerful tribes
that the government removed from the Southeast and granted sub-
stantial holdings in Indian Territory.163  However, commercial activi-
ties of those tribes were curbed by forced federal actions leading to
liquidation of tribal land holdings and Oklahoma statehood.164  Those
moves were a major part of the long-term federal policy to assimilate
Native people by ending the importance of tribal governments and
property.165  That policy was discredited in the 1920s, and the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934166 passed by Congress formally reversed
it.167  However, the policy shift had not revived enough tribal involve-
ment in commerce to generate any new contest over tribal immunity
by 1953, when federal policy reverted to termination of tribes’ federal
status.168
The termination scheme generated tribal resistance, augmented
by inspiration from the Civil Rights Movement.169  Federal policy
shifted solidly in favor of tribal sovereignty, marked by President
159. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 173-197 and accompanying text.
161. Almost every academic commentary on governmental immunity criticizes the
doctrine and calls for its abolition, in terms of varying vehemence. See, e.g., ORTH, supra
note 68, at 149-59; JACOBS, supra note 46, at 150-64; Brinton, supra note 155 passim;
Gibbons, supra note 46, at 1890-95, 2003-04; Borchard, supra note 47.  So also do some
judicial opinions. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
162. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045-56 (2014) (dis-
senting ops.); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756-58 (1998); see also Ki-
owa, 523 U.S. at 760-66 (dissenting op.).
163. See DEBO, supra note 123.
164. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 4.07.
165. See id. § 1.04.
166. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
167. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 1.05.
168. See id. § 1.06.
169. See id. § 1.07.
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Nixon’s 1971 declaration.170  Thereafter tribal commercial activity
gradually increased.  Inevitably, suits against tribes, and the issue of
immunity, returned to the courts.  The Unived States v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co.171 decision172 had made judicial recognition of tribal immu-
nity a Supreme Court precedent.  Challengers had to distinguish it,
seek its modification, or ask Congress to override it.
Tribal immunity returned to the Court in a dispute over treaty
fishing rights in Washington.  The State Department of Game sued
the Puyallup Tribe and forty-one of its members for a declaratory
judgment and injunction to restrict tribal treaty fishing rights.173  The
suit was in state court, the first reported tribal immunity case in a
state forum.  The litigation spanned fourteen years and was reviewed
no less than three times by the Supreme Court.174  It was a protracted
battle over interpretation of the tribe’s treaty, and the final judgment
bound the tribal fishermen individually.175  But the Court held that
tribal immunity barred jurisdiction over the tribe.176
A year after the Puyallup Tribe177 immunity decision, the Court
held that immunity barred federal court jurisdiction over the Santa
Clara Pueblo tribe.178  The case involved the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,179 a federal statute that imposed most provisions of the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment on tribal governments.180
A 1986 decision held that a state statute denying tribes access to
the state’s courts, unless the tribe waived its immunity was pre-
empted by federal law.181  Five years later, a tribe sued state officials
to enjoin the defendants’ efforts to collect the state’s cigarette tax on
sales by a tribally-owned business.182  Defendants counterclaimed
against the tribe seeking a judgment for back taxes and an injunction
170. See id.
171. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
172. See supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text.
173. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977).
174. Puyallup, 433 U.S. at 167.
175. Id. at 172-73.
176. Id. at 178.
177. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
178. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
179. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968).
180. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51-52, 56-58 (citing and discussing 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1976)). Prior to the decision, lower federal courts had found an implied
federal cause of action to enforce the statute.  Some cases named tribes as defendants,
and some tribes argued immunity as a defense, but courts held that the statute over-
rode immunity. See, e.g., Crowe v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231, 1233
(4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Cmty., 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir.
1973).  All decisions that had found a federal cause of action were, of course, overruled
by Santa Clara Pueblo.
181. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890-91 (1986).
182. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizens Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
507 (1991).
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to collect taxes in the future.183  The tribe asserted sovereign immu-
nity against the counterclaim, and the Court held that the tribe’s suit
for injunctive relief did not waive its immunity to claims for dam-
ages.184  However, in a 2001 decision, the Court held that a tribal con-
tract that provided for arbitration of disputes had waived its
immunity to suit in a state court.185 The Court’s opinion recognized
tribal immunity yet again and said a tribal waiver must be “clear” but
held that the contract in question had met that standard.186
A 1998 decision directly confronted the question whether tribes
enjoy immunity for activities outside Indian country.187  A tribe de-
faulted on a promissory note made to a corporation, and the corpora-
tion sued for enforcement in state court, alleging that the note was
made outside Indian country.188  The Supreme Court held that tribal
immunity barred the claim.189  A number of prior decisions had in-
volved events outside Indian country, but the question whether immu-
nity was limited to tribal territory had been raised only in one
decision, where the Court determined that the dispute had arisen
within Indian country.190  The 1998 case generated a significant dis-
sent, and the majority opinion questioned whether immunity should
continue for tribal business activities.191
The issue returned to the Court in 2014.  The Bay Mills Indian
Community had a gaming compact with the State of Michigan author-
izing a casino on its reservation near Sault Ste. Marie.192  To increase
its income, the tribe bought land to the south near Traverse City and
opened another gaming facility.193  The tribe claimed the move was
lawful, but Michigan disagreed and sued in U.S. district court, seeking
to enjoin the new casino.  The tribe pleaded sovereign immunity, but
the trial court ruled for the State.194  The Court of Appeals reversed
based on immunity, and the Supreme Court affirmed.195  Based on
183. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 507-08.
184. Id. at 509.
185. C & L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418
(2001).
186. C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 418-20.  The Court expressly agreed with lower court
decisions enforcing tribal waivers. Id. at 417, 420-21. See, e.g., Sokaogan Gaming Enter.
Corp. v. Tushe-Montgomery Assocs., 86 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1996).
187. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754 (1998).
188. Id. at 753-54.
189. Id. at 754-57.
190. See Okla. Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 511. Other decisions that appear to have
involved activities outside Indian country include Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 168; U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 508-09; Thebo, 66 F. at 375.
191. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756-58, 760-68.
192. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2029.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2028-30.
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Michigan’s claim that the dispute arose outside Indian country, the
1998 issue was presented again.196  The Court affirmed off-reserva-
tion immunity, but only by a five-to-four vote.197
The split votes in the 1998 and 2014 cases shed an unusually
clear light on judicial leanings—or perhaps biases?  In divided cases,
conservative justices are less likely to sustain Indian rights against
states, but they normally vote to uphold sovereign immunity.198  Lib-
eral justices oppose sovereign immunity but are more likely to side
with tribes.199  Tribal immunity issues force each justice to decide
what policy is the more important, immunity or Indian rights.  The
1998 Kiowa Tribe200 majority comprised Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer.  Justices Ste-
vens, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented.201  Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg were and are ardent opponents of immunity, and their records on
Indian rights are mixed at best.202
The 2014 decision involved four new justices.203  Of the five who
sat in both cases, four voted the same way; Justice Scalia changed
sides.204  Therefore to retain immunity, Bay Mills needed the votes of
three of the four replacements, and it obtained just that.  Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan voted to retain tribal im-
munity, and Justice Alito joined the dissenters.205  Tribal immunity
196. See id. at 2032.
197. Id. passim.
198. The point is straightforward for state immunity.  See the divided votes in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (five-to-four); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1 (1989) (five-to-four, no majority); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Hwys & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (five-to-four, no majority); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (five-to-four); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984) (five-to-four); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (five-to-three).  On
Indian rights, see the extended discussion in Getches, supra note 14.
199. See infra note 202.  The other relevant policy, stare decisis, appears important
to some justices who have supported tribal immunity based on precedent. See, e.g., Bay
Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2036-39.
200. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
201. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756-57.
202. Justice Ginsburg voted against state immunity in Seminole Tribe and Idaho v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).  She voted against tribal immunity in Bay
Mills and Kiowa. On her overall record in Indian rights cases, see Carole Goldberg,
Finding the Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian
Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1014-15 (2009).  Justice Stevens voted against immu-
nity in every divided decision on the issue after his 1975 appointment, and his recent
book, Six Amendments: How We Should Change the Constitution, would abolish state
sovereign immunity from federal law. SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION (2014).  On his record in Indian law cases, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
The Indian Law Legacy of Justice Stevens, TURTLE TALK (April 9, 2010), https://tur-
tletalk.wordpress.com/2010/04/09/the-indian-law-legacy-of-justice-stevens/.
203. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2036-39.
204. See id.
205. See id.
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made it past another test in 2017.  The Court held that an off-reserva-
tion tort case against a Connecticut tribe’s employee personally was
not shielded by tribal immunity.206  Will tribal immunity survive
President Trump appointments to the Court?
B. IMMUNITY IN SUITS AGAINST TRIBAL OFFICERS
Given the abundant history of suing officers as a way around sov-
ereign immunity, those who want to sue tribes have, of course, tried
that method.  In all pre-World War II cases in which tribal officers
were sued, plaintiffs sought money judgments or similar relief that
would have run against the tribal defendant, and federal courts read-
ily rejected the attempt.207  There were no complexities arising from
the Contracts Clause or the Eleventh Amendment.208  The courts sus-
tained immunity together with the occasional remark that Congress
had power to override it.209
The 1977 Puyallup Tribe fishing rights decision was the first to
present the distinct question of prospective equitable relief against in-
dividuals.210  Washington sued the tribe and forty-one fisherman-
members in state court.  It could have sought retroactive relief for past
actions but did not.211  The Supreme Court ordered dismissal of the
tribe based on immunity but allowed a prospective judgment against
individual members (to the limited extent that Washington’s claims
were sustained).212  To be sure, the individuals were not officers rep-
resenting a defendant government, but the effect was the same—the
tribe was bound prospectively.
The next year the Court heard Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,213
a federal court action seeking prospective relief against a tribe.214
206. Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).  The case involved a knotty mix of
state-federal issues.  A tribal casino’s on-duty limousine rear-ended the plaintiffs’ car.
The tribe had consented to tort claims, but subject to a one-year statute of limitations
that the plaintiffs missed.  They sued the limousine driver personally in state court but
lost based on immunity.  Argument in the Court renewed the basic issue of tribal immu-
nity outside Indian country, but the Court’s majority simply ruled that immunity
shielded only the tribe, not the driver personally.  On remand, the state courts will de-
cide if state law immunizes the driver.  Justices Thomas and Ginsburg renewed their
view that tribal immunity outside Indian country should be overruled.  Justice Alito
joined the Court.  Justice Gorsuch did not sit.
207. See supra notes 123-125, 127-132, 141-143 and accompanying text.
208. Neither provision applies to tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1; U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. On application to states, see supra Section IV.B.
209. See supra Section VI.A.1 and notes 128, 134, 137 and accompanying text.
210. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977); see
also supra note 173 and accompanying text.
211. See Puyallup Tribe, 433 U.S. at 168-72.
212. See id. at 172-73.
213. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
214. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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The action named the Pueblo and its governor as defendants.215  The
Court held that immunity barred suit against the Pueblo by name, but
it sustained jurisdiction over its governor, relying on Ex parte
Young216 by analogy.217  The Court held that plaintiffs’ case failed for
lack of a federal cause of action, so the case was dismissed without a
judgment against the Governor.218
In 1982, an insurer who had been subjected to a default judgment
in Crow Tribal Court sued the tribe and its officers in federal district
court to contest tribal court jurisdiction over the case.219 The tribe
pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense, and when the case reached
the Supreme Court, tribal immunity was a question presented in
briefing to the Court.220  However, the Court’s unanimous opinion
said nothing about the issue.  There were several possible reasons.
The Court held that no immediate order against defendants was justi-
fied.221  To the extent that the ruling allowed later relief for the in-
surer, officers were named and prospective relief was sought, so any
order could be made against them by analogy to Ex parte Young.222
And silence avoided revealing internal differences within the Court on
tribal immunity.
In 1988, South Dakota sued the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and
two of its officers for prospective equitable relief to determine rights to
govern non-Indian hunting and fishing on land within the tribal reser-
vation but not owned by the tribe.223  The tribe successfully pleaded
sovereign immunity, but the District Court upheld authority to pro-
ceed against tribal officers.224  The action ended with a 1993 Supreme
Court judgment against the tribal chairman.225
In the 1991 decision that dismissed the Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion’s counterclaim for tobacco taxes, the Commission lamented its in-
215. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978).
216. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
217. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 58.
218. Id. at 59-72. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1980), aff’d, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (dictum) (“The Tribe’s immunity from suit does not
extend to tribal officials.”).
219. Nat’l Farmers’ Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
220. Brief for Crow Respondents at 1, Nat’l Farmers’ Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (No. 84-320).
221. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 853-57.
222. Id. at 848.
223. South Dakota v. Ducheneaux, No. 88-3049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834
(D.S.D. Aug. 21, 1990), rev’d, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. South Dakota
v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
224. Duchenaux, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834, at *1-2.
225. See Bourland, 508 U.S. 679. This was the first straightforward Supreme Court
judgment on the merits against a tribal official that bound the tribe by analogy to Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and its federal counterparts.
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ability to enforce its laws against a tribal smoke shop.226  The Court
responded with a list of remedies that included suit against tribal of-
ficers or members, citing Ex parte Young.227
In 1992, a non-Indian firm that was sued in a tribal court filed a
federal action to contest jurisdiction of the tribal court.228  It named
only tribal officers, lost in U.S. District Court, but won on appeal,
eventually obtaining a Supreme Court judgment against tribal
judges.229
In 1993, a non-Indian business operating within the Navajo Res-
ervation sued the tribe in federal court to contest validity of a tribal
tax.230  The tribe moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.
While the motion was pending, plaintiff amended its complaint to add
a tribal tax commissioner as defendant.231  The District Court dis-
missed the tribe but proceeded to judgment with the tax commissioner
as defendant, dismissing for failure to exhaust tribal remedies.232
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed and ruled against the tribal officials on
the merits.233
The latest word from the Court is its dictum in Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Community,234 opining that suit against tribal officials is
a remedy that may be available to Michigan.235  Given this history, it
is reasonably clear that while tribes are immune from any suit against
them by name, and tribal officers cannot be sued for damages or other
retroactive relief that would run against the tribe, suits against of-
ficers for prospective relief are not barred by tribal immunity.236
226. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 511-12.
227. See id. at 512-14.  In Burlington N. R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992), two Montana tribes imposed taxes on the
railroad’s rights-of-way crossing their reservations.  The railroad sued the tribes and
their officials to contest legality of the taxes, and the tribes pleaded sovereign immu-
nity.  The court held that immunity barred suit against the tribes, but an action for
prospective relief lay against tribal officials, and the Court cited Santa Clara. Id. at
901-02.  On the merits, the court held that the taxes were valid.
228. A-1 Contractors v. Strate, No. CIV. A1-92-24, 1992 WL 696330, at *1 (D.N.D.
Sept. 16, 1992), rev’d, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
229. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
230. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Navajo Nation, 866 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.N.M. 1994),
aff’d sub nom. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000), rev’d,
532 U.S. 645 (2001).
231. Navajo Nation, 866 F. Supp. at 508.
232. Id. passim.  At some point before judgment, the other tribal tax commissioners
were added as defendants.
233. See Shirley, 532 U.S. 645.
234. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
235. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2035 (2014).
236. For an interesting variant, see Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d
1226 (10th Cir. 2014).  Jurisdiction was upheld under Ex parte Young in action by one
tribe against another.
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Lawyers for tribes may continue to contest the Ex parte Young
question, arguing that Supreme Court statements approving jurisdic-
tion are mostly dicta.237  To date it is unclear what alternative theory
they will proffer.  One possibility is to claim that tribal officials are
immune unless Congress expressly overrides immunity or a particular
tribe waives its immunity.  That is the governing rule for suits against
tribes by name, so it is a logical extension.238  The main difficulty is
that this would seem to preclude any remedy against a tribe’s action
outside Indian country.  That was the issue that inspired the grant of
certiorari in Bay Mills, the dissent’s four votes to overturn immunity,
and the majority’s reply that Michigan may have a remedy akin to Ex
parte Young.239  The latter was technically dictum but in context a
nudge away from a holding.  Moreover, were a court to sustain a tribal
claim to immunity from any legal remedy, Congress would likely act to
override and might limit tribal immunity more extensively.
C. SCOPE OF JURISDICTION TO GRANT PROSPECTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
TRIBAL OFFICERS
If tribal immunity does not categorically bar suits against tribal
officers in federal and state courts, what are the limits of judicial
power?  The most frequently successful defense in reported cases is
part of standard immunity doctrine: the claim that retroactive relief is
sought so that the real party in interest is the tribe, requiring dismis-
sal based on immunity.240
There is the usual array of other defenses.  If relief against a tribe
is sought based on an alleged waiver, the waiver must be lawfully
adopted, usually based on legislative authority; consent in a contract
lacking proper authority is invalid.241  Any federal civil action re-
237. As the review above shows, no Supreme Court decision against a tribal official
on the merits expressly addressed the Ex parte Young immunity question. See supra
note 225 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Section VI.A.
239. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030, 2035, 2045-56.
240. E.g., Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1221 (2009); Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co.,
546 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2008); Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 966 (2004); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 177
F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018 (2000); Imperial Granite Co. v.
Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1991). See Alltel Commc’ns, LLC,
v. DeJordy, 675 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2012) (immunity barred subpoena duces tecum
served on tribe and tribal official).  The defense is sometimes raised indirectly by claim-
ing that tribes are indispensable parties and immune. E.g., Shermoen v. United States,
982 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 903 (1993). See also Vann v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 701 F.3d 927 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (sustaining jurisdiction over official
based on Ex parte Young; tribe not indispensable).
241. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp., 658 F.3d
684 (7th Cir. 2011) (waiver in void indenture also void).
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quires a proper basis for district court jurisdiction, standing, and a
federal cause of action.242  State courts often lack jurisdiction over In-
dians in Indian country.243  A federal statutory remedy or arbitration
agreement may provide an exclusive remedy.244
A conceptual question so far not addressed by any court is illus-
trated by frequent invocations of Ex parte Young245 as the purported
model for equitable actions against tribal officers.246  However, the in-
ternal federal rule may be a more apt and predictable model. Ex parte
Young emerged from the turmoil of the Eleventh Amendment and its
expansion in Hans v Louisiana247 in 1890.248  State immunity from
federal law has been the subject of nearly continuous attacks from
both sides.249 State sovereignty advocates claim that interpretations
of the Ex parte Young exception are overbroad.250  Advocates for state
accountability to federal law regularly assail state immunity root and
branch.251  Assertions that the governing rules are settled are risky at
best.
By contrast, despite past inconsistencies,252 the internal federal
rule seems stable and is seldom questioned.  The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act253 expressly consents to suits for prospective relief within
242. Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1054 (2005) (federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
arbitration award despite tribe’s waiver of immunity); Jefferson State Bank v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, No. CV 11-8100-PCT-PGR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134499 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 21, 2011) (no subject matter jurisdiction); Harris v. Sycuan Band of Diegueno
Mission Indians, No. 08cv2111-WQH-AJB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119226 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 18, 2009) (same). See Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 737
F.3d 1075 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1151 (2014) (case dismissed based on
ripeness defense); Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237, 1245-50 (11th Cir. 1999)
(no federal cause of action).
243. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
244. Oklahoma v. Hobia, 775 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 33
(2015).
245. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
246. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2035 (2014);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
247. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
248. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Section V.B-C.
250. See, e.g., John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008). Cf.
David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
69 (2011) (reviewing Harrison and discussing other scholars).  Moreover, another mod-
ern sovereignty defense against federal authority to command states would bar use of
the Ex parte Young to enforce the unconstitutional command. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  Tribes
have no such immunity.
251. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying text.
252. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immu-
nity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
253. 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
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its scope; actions can name the United States as a party defendant.254
One might object that suing tribes in state or federal court involves
intergovernmental immunity, as did Ex parte Young, but this is mis-
leading.  According to the Court, tribal immunity is entirely a matter
of federal law and of federal preemption of state law.255  It is subject
to alteration by Congress but not to the vicissitudes of judicial inter-
pretations of the Eleventh Amendment.  State sovereignty nips at its
heels, but that is true for all aspects of tribal sovereignty.256
The unique aspect of tribal sovereign immunity is its applicability
outside Indian country.257  As the Bay Mills258 dissent stressed, tribes
and their members outside Indian country are subject to substantive
state laws absent specific federal preemption.259  In a leading case, a
tribal ski resort was held subject to state tax.260  Tribal immunity
complicates states’ efforts to enforce their laws directly against tribes,
which barred Michigan’s suit against the Bay Mills tribe.261  But the
Bay Mills Court stated that suits against tribal officials for prospec-
tive relief are a valid remedy.  It cited Santa Clara Pueblo,262 which
upheld Ex parte Young-style prospective relief against a tribal
officer.263
What if a state took other actions against tribal officers or mem-
bers, such as arrest?  The 1998 Kiowa Tribe264 case involved a private
debt in which jurisdiction over the tribe was the only possible form of
enforcement other than a tribal forum.265  But the 2014 Bay Mills
case illustrates the broader problem.  The Bay Mills tribe bought land
and opened a casino over the state’s opposition.266  The state sued the
tribe to enjoin the operation, and the courts dismissed based on immu-
nity but said the state could reach the merits by suing a tribal officer,
citing Santa Clara.267  What if instead the state had arrested the tri-
bal employees who operated the southern casino?  The Bay Mills
Court said it could do so “to the extent civil remedies proved inade-
254. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702.
255. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2030-31, 2037-39.
256. See Getches, supra note 14, at 320-21.
257. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2047-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
258. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
259. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2047 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).  The tribe had sued the
State; thus, like any sovereign plaintiff, it consented to lose the case it filed.
261. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2034; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizens Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511-14 (1991).
262. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
263. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2034-35.
264. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
265. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
266. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2029.
267. Id. at 2035.
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quate.”268  The fair implication is that the employees would be
shielded from arrest by tribal immunity and the state’s remedy lim-
ited to injunction so long as that remedy were adequate.  In other
words, tribal immunity in this circumstance shields tribal members
acting for the tribe from state authority other than suit for injunction.
However, based on the 1977 Puyallup Tribe269 decision, the state
could seek the injunction in its own courts as well as in federal
court.270
D. TRIBAL CONSENT TO BE SUED: USES AND ABUSES OF TRIBAL
IMMUNITY
Tribal governments face the same array of issues as their state
and federal counterparts to establish policy for immunity.  Calls for
waivers are loudest over tort and consumer immunity, when ag-
grieved persons lack a realistic chance to decide on immunity risks in
advance.  Tribes are involved in today’s commercial world, most dra-
matically in operating casinos.271  For any retail activity, tort waivers
are crucial for fairness and efficient business operations.  Customers
expect redress.  Most tribes with commercial enterprises have acted
accordingly and provide remedies.272
Tribes also have incentives not shared by state and federal gov-
ernment.  When a tribe seeks to add to its land base by asking the
Interior Department to take land into trust, opponents cite immunity
as a reason to deny the request.  More dramatically, the Bay Mills273
Court threatened to overturn immunity judicially if tribes do not
waive appropriately.274  Tribes must also consider possible policy
changes by the Trump Administration or Congress.  When courts have
been asked to imply federal override of tribal immunity, they have
268. Id.
269. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
270. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 168 (1977); see
also C & L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)
(suit in state court based on waiver).
271. See NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM’N, https://www.nigc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2018).  On waivers in casino compacts, see infra note 289.
272. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 6.05, 12.05[2], 21.02[2].  Casino compacts in-
clude waivers for enforcement claims, most consent to tort claims, and some consent to
adjudication of prize disputes. See, e.g., state statutory compacts: CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 12012.25 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-13-1 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
3A, § 281 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.46.360 (West 2017).  Most of these
compacts also waive immunity for claims that dispute gaming prizes.
273. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
274. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036-37 n.8 (2014).
(The Court has never addressed whether immunity would apply “if a tort victim, or
other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain
relief for off-reservation conduct”)
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been remarkably resistant.275  But an explicit override by Congress
will be sustained.276
A few tribes have deployed their immunity in a unique way by
renting it out to payday lenders.277  Federal law allows these lenders
to operate freely, but a number of states have restricted their practices
to protect borrowers.278  Tribal immunity has defeated attempts to
sue lenders under such laws.279  This in turn has led to criticism of
this deployment of immunity.280
In formulating immunity policy, tribes need to consider the range
of legislative choices involved.  Immunity waivers by state and federal
governments seldom consent to treat the government as the legal
equivalent of a private defendant.  For a major example, the Federal
Tort Claims Act281 consents to liability like that applicable to private
275. See, e.g., Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians, 836 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1331 (2017) (no implied override per Fair & Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)); Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n Inc.
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) (no implied override per
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990));
Muller v. Morongo Casino, Resort, & Spa, No. EDCV 14-02308-VAP (KKx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79457 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (no implied override per Americans with
Disabilities Act or Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(1993)); Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, No. 14-594-CG-M, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88247 (S.D. Ala. June 10, 2015) (no implied override per Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); In re Greektown Holdings LLC, 532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. June 9,
2015) (no implied override per bankruptcy statute).  Congress has at times expressly
negated implied override. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3746 (2012).  Courts have also refused to
imply waiver of immunity when a tribe sued in state court removes to federal court,
contrary to the rule for states. See, e.g., Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole
Tribe, 692 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 843 (2013).
276. Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000) (tribal immunity overridden by text and history of
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974)); Blue Leg v. U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (same for Resource Conserva-
tion & Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976)).
277. See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders
and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 751 (2012).
278. Eighteen states forbid high-interest payday loans; thirty-one states allow
them. See Legal Status of Payday Loans by State, PAYDAY LOAN CONSUMER INFO.,
www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).  The FTC does
police fraudulent practices in the industry. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1123215-x120020/broadway-global-master-
inc. (last visited Jan. 27, 2018)
279. See, e.g., Bynon v. Mansfield, No. 15-00206, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100754
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2016); Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State ex rel. Suthers,
242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010); Ameriloan v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572, 575-76
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
280. See Martin & Schwartz, supra note 277; Adam Mayle, Note, Usury on the Res-
ervation: Regulation of Tribal-Affiliated Payday Lenders, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
1053 (2012); Heather L. Petrovich, Comment, Circumventing State Consumer Protection
Laws: Tribal Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 N.C. L. REV. 326 (2012).
281. 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
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defendants, but it denies trial by civil jury.282  A tort jury can readily
become an instrument of political protest—imagine a Tea Party jury
in a suit against the federal government.  Many state consents allow
juries but impose damages caps for torts cases not applicable to pri-
vate defendants.283  A common form is to limit damages according to
applicable insurance limits.284  Licensing laws may require tribal en-
terprises to obtain insurance for motor vehicles and alcohol sales,285
but coverage for all activities should be sought.  Punitive damages are
forbidden or available on restricted terms.286  Shorter statutes of limi-
tations, or special notice rules, sometimes apply.287
For tribes, a major question is choice of forum.  Consent to suit in
tribal courts is an obvious choice, and it can work for such matters as
tort claims by casino customers.288  But contracting parties may insist
on an external forum.  For many historical reasons, tribes are wary of
state courts and juries.289  One wonders whether a tribe can consent
to suit in state court but not to civil juries, which state constitutions
often guarantee.290  The question is one of state law that could go ei-
282. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402 (2012).  The Seventh Amendment jury right does not
apply to actions against the United States. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61
(1981).
283. See 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 47, § 6.12.
284. See id.
285. For alcohol sales, tribes need a state license with whatever insurance coverage
the state requires. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).  For motor vehicles, tribes elect-
ing to obtain state registration, and tribal members choosing to obtain state driving
licenses, must comply with state insurance requirements.
286. 1 THOMSON/WEST, supra note 47, § 6.10.
287. See id. at ch. 5.
288. Tribes must, of course, decide whether their courts should entertain suits
against the tribe. See Ralph W. Johnson & James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in
Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153 (1984).
289. This is evident in the protracted dispute contesting state court jurisdiction over
tribal casino tort claims in New Mexico.  The New Mexico Supreme Court held that
legislative consent is required for casino compacts. State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904
P.2d 11, 15 (N.M. 1995).  The state legislature then modified and approved compacts
that had been negotiated with six tribes, including a provision for tort claims that con-
sented to state court jurisdiction “unless it is finally determined by a state or federal
court that IGRA does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors’ personal injury
suits to state court,” a proviso sought by the tribes.  The legislature formalized state law
in a 2001 statute that included the same provision. See Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 154
P.3d 644 (N.M. 2007) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-13A-1-5 (West 2017)).  The state
supreme court held that the federal statute did not preclude tribal consent to state court
jurisdiction. Santa Clara Pueblo, 154 P.3d 644.  But the tribes contested the issue in
federal court and prevailed in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Nash, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1254
(D.N.M. 2013).  For a like contest in Oklahoma, see Muhammad v. Comanche Nation
Casino, No. CIV-09-968-D, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114945 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2010
(waivers lawful, but Oklahoma compact statute did not consent to state court jurisdic-
tion over casino tort claims).
290. See Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655
(1963) (most state constitutions guarantee jury trial in civil cases, although it is unclear
if the guarantees apply to consented suits against governments).
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ther way in a given state.  Tribes’ view of federal courts is usually
more favorable, but one cannot create federal court jurisdiction by con-
sent.291  For these reasons, many tribes have chosen instead to agree
to arbitration, which of course avoids the civil jury question.292  On
the other hand, tribes could consider matching at least some aspects of
the immunity law of the states in which tribal territory is found, to
reduce the confusion of differing rules.293
These considerations have been tested in practice by casino-own-
ing tribes across the country.  The Federal Indian Gaming Regulation
Act294 (“IGRA”) governs casinos.295  IGRA requires a negotiated com-
pact between state and tribal governments, and lawful casinos must
be tribally owned.296  Thus, immunity issues are built into IGRA’s
structure.  The statute explicitly authorizes federal court jurisdiction
to enforce compact terms by injunction or declaratory judgment, but
other issues are left to tribes’ discretion or negotiated terms.297  Tri-
bal-state compacts now exist in twenty-six states.298  In eighteen of
them, published compact terms address enforcement of compact terms
and tort remedies for patrons who claim injury.299
291. Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (although
tribe consented to be sued in federal district court, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction).
292. See, e.g., C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S.
411 (2001); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
554 U.S. 944 (2008); New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, 90 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1996);
Feather Smoke Shops, LLC v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 236 P.3d 54 (Okla. 2009).
293. Three casino tribes have done so to some extent. See infra note 298.
294. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988).
295. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1166-1168 (2012).
296. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).  In other contexts, issues arise over immunity claimed by
tribally-chartered corporations or other entities. See, e.g., Alabama v. PCI Gaming
Auth., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015).
297. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(2).  This provision gives federal district courts juris-
diction over “any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III
gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State
compact . . . that is in effect.” Id.  The text does not literally override tribal immunity,
and Congress has no power to override state immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).  However, the Court held that the provision waives tribal immunity.
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2032 (2014).  And with or without
a specific waiver, enforcement by injunction is available against officers of either gov-
ernment. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text; Section V.B-C.
298. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-
IA/OIG/Compacts/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).  The site includes links to all
existing compacts.
299. See id.  Some compact provisions waive immunity explicitly, others imply that
tribal laws include waivers.  Compact enforcement waivers are limited to injunctive re-
lief and often specify arbitration as a method of enforcement.  Some tort provisions have
explicit caps on damages.  In ten states, waivers extend to patrons’ claims that they
were unfairly denied prizes.  In seven, explicit provisions protect casino employees.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Tribal capacity to sue was once contested but no longer.  Tribes
have the inherent capacity of sovereign entities under federal law.
For that status, a tribe must gain federal recognition, but the gov-
erning rules and procedures are by now well settled.  And all states
now respect governmental status of federally-recognized tribes.
Today’s unsettled law and practice involve tribal sovereign immu-
nity to suit.  Based in federal law, it can be altered by Congress, but
that does not appear to be a major concern.  More threatening is the
Court’s Bay Mills300 decision, raising the specter of judicial abolition.
It provides a powerful incentive for tribes to adopt modern forms of
consent to suit, taking into consideration limits in federal and state
consents.  Threats aside, so long as tribes have immunity, the remedy
of prospective relief against tribal officers will be important.  Courts
will be asked to sort out the remedy’s scope.
300. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
